Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA

István Vajda

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Paper 2011/103

Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA

István Vajda

Abstract

We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of a routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we show that the route discovery protocol does not output a non-existing path under arbitrary active attacks, where on a non-existing path there exists at least one pair of neighboring nodes without communication connection during the run of the route discovery protocol. The proof relies on the Dolev-Yao-style model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. cryptanalysis
Contact author(s): vajda @ hit bme hu
History: 2011-03-05: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/103
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/103,
      author = {István Vajda},
      title = {Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/103},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/103}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/103}
}