Automatic Insertion of DPA Countermeasures

Andrew Moss; Elisabeth Oswald; Dan Page; Michael Tunstall

Paper 2011/412

Automatic Insertion of DPA Countermeasures

Andrew Moss, Elisabeth Oswald, Dan Page, and Michael Tunstall

Abstract

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks find a statistical correlation between the power consumption of a cryptographic device and intermediate values within the computation. Randomization of intermediate values breaks statistical dependence and thus prevents such attacks. The current state of the art in countermeasures involves manual manipulation of low-level assembly language to insert random masking. This paper introduces an algorithm to automate the process allowing the development of compilers capable of protecting programs against DPA.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Differential Power Analysis Secure Implementations Compilers
Contact author(s): tunstall @ cs bris ac uk
History: 2011-08-15: revised; 2011-08-05: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/412
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/412,
      author = {Andrew Moss and Elisabeth Oswald and Dan Page and Michael Tunstall},
      title = {Automatic Insertion of DPA Countermeasures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/412},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/412}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/412}
}