Paper 2013/460

Solving Terminal Revocation in EAC by Augmenting Terminal Authentication

Rafik Chaabouni

Abstract

In this paper we propose a solution to enable an accurate terminal revocation in the Extended Access Control (EAC). Chaabouni and Vaudenay in [CV09] pointed out the need for an accurate revocation procedure, but failed to provide a complete solution description. We aim at filling this gap. Our solution relies on augmenting terminal authentication with a t-out-of-l threshold signature provided by neighboring terminals. These terminals will be in charge of checking the revocation status of the requested terminal. As Terminals have a real clock embedded and more computational power than Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), they are better suited for checking revocation status.

Note: minor revisions and typos (this is the fullpaper version)

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. proceedings of BIOSIG 2013
Keywords
EACMRTDAuthenticationRevocation
Contact author(s)
rafik @ chaabouni ch
History
2013-08-13: revised
2013-07-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/460
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/460,
      author = {Rafik Chaabouni},
      title = {Solving Terminal Revocation in EAC by Augmenting Terminal Authentication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/460},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/460}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/460}
}
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