Paper 2013/721

Deep Attacks of a Certificateless Signature Scheme

Bo Yang, Zhao Yang, Zibi Xiao, and Shougui Li

Abstract

Certificateless public key cryptography is an attractive paradigm since it eliminates the use of certificates in traditional public key cryptography and alleviates the inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. Recently, Xiong et al. proposed a certificateless signature scheme and proved that their scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack under the random oracle model. He et al. pointed out that Xiong et al.’s scheme is insecure against the Type II adversary. But, their forged signatures are not random, and their improved scheme has the same security defects as Xiong et al.’s scheme. In this paper, we present two malicious-but-passive KGC attack methods on Xiong et al.’s scheme and our results show that their scheme is insecure against malicious-but-passive KGC attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Certificateless cryptographySignature SchemeCryptanalysisBilinear Pairing
Contact author(s)
boyangcn @ 126 com
History
2013-11-07: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/721
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/721,
      author = {Bo Yang and Zhao Yang and Zibi Xiao and Shougui Li},
      title = {Deep Attacks of a Certificateless Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/721},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/721}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/721}
}
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