Paper 2015/037

Analysis and Enhancement of Desynchronization Attack on an Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol

Da-Zhi Sun, Zahra Ahmadian, Yue-Jiao Wang, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract

As low-cost RFID tags become more and more ubiquitous, it is necessary to design ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols to prevent possible attacks and threats. We reevaluate Ahmadian et al.’s desynchronization attack on the ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol with permutation (RAPP). Our results are twofold: (1) we demonstrate that the probability of the desynchronization between the tag and the reader is 15/64 instead of 1/4 as claimed, when RAPP uses Hamming weight-based rotation; (2) we further improve the original attack and make the desynchronization more efficient.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
cryptanalysisidentification protocolRFID securityultralightweight protocolauthenticationdesynchronization attack
Contact author(s)
sundazhi @ tju edu cn
History
2016-01-05: last of 3 revisions
2015-01-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/037
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/037,
      author = {Da-Zhi Sun and Zahra Ahmadian and Yue-Jiao Wang and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref},
      title = {Analysis and Enhancement of Desynchronization Attack on an Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/037},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/037}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/037}
}
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