The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA

Boris Ryabko; Aleksandr Soskov

Paper 2018/047

The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA

Boris Ryabko and Aleksandr Soskov

Abstract

The purpose of the work is to estimate the resistance of lightweight block ciphers Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT, LEA to a distinguishing attack. (This attack is a form of cryptanalysis on data encrypted by a cipher that allows an attacker to distinguish the encrypted data from random data.) Modern lightweight block ciphers must be designed to be immune to such an attack. It turned out that Speck, Simon, HIGHT and LEA showed a sufficient resistance to the distinguishing attack, but Simeck with 48-bit block size and 96-bit key size was not immune to this attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s): boris @ ryabko net
History: 2018-01-15: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/047
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/047,
      author = {Boris Ryabko and Aleksandr Soskov},
      title = {The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/047},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/047}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/047}
}