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Paper 2018/564
Impossibility on Tamper-Resilient Cryptography with Uniqueness Properties
Yuyu Wang, Takahiro Matsuda, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Keisuke Tanaka
Abstract
In this work, we show negative results on the tamper-resilience of a wide class of cryptographic primitives with uniqueness properties, such as unique signatures, verifiable random functions, signatures with unique keys, injective one-way functions, and encryption schemes with a property we call unique-message property. Concretely, we prove that for these primitives, it is impossible to derive their (even extremely weak) tamper-resilience from any common assumption, via black-box reductions. Our proofs exploit the simulatable attack paradigm proposed by Wichs (ITCS ’13), and the tampering model we treat is the plain model, where there is no trusted setup.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in PKC 2021
- Keywords
- black-box separationsimulatable attacktamper-resilienceuniqueness
- Contact author(s)
-
wang y ar @ m titech ac jp
t-matsuda @ aist go jp
hanaoka-goichiro @ aist go jp
keisuke @ is titech ac jp - History
- 2021-04-24: revised
- 2018-06-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/564
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/564,
author = {Yuyu Wang and Takahiro Matsuda and Goichiro Hanaoka and Keisuke Tanaka},
title = {Impossibility on Tamper-Resilient Cryptography with Uniqueness Properties},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/564},
year = {2018},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/564}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/564}
}
