Paper 2019/1112

Subliminal Hash Channels

George Teseleanu

Abstract

Due to their nature, subliminal channels are mostly regarded as being malicious, but due to recent legislation efforts users' perception might change. Such channels can be used to subvert digital signature protocols without degrading the security of the underlying primitive. Thus, it is natural to find countermeasures and devise subliminal-free signatures. In this paper we discuss state-of-the-art countermeasures and introduce a generic method to bypass them.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. A2C 2019
Keywords
subliminal channelskleptographysetup attackshash channels
Contact author(s)
george teseleanu @ yahoo com
History
2022-03-15: last of 2 revisions
2019-10-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1112
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1112,
      author = {George Teseleanu},
      title = {Subliminal Hash Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1112},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1112}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1112}
}
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