Paper 2019/1341
Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation
Andrew Morgan, Rafael Pass, and Antigoni Polychroniadou
Abstract
We present the first maliciously secure protocol for succinct non-interactive secure two-party computation (SNISC): Each player sends just a single message whose length is (essentially) independent of the running time of the function to be computed. The protocol does not require any trusted setup, satisfies superpolynomial-time simulation-based security (SPS), and is based on (subexponential) security of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. We do not rely on SNARKs or "knowledge of exponent"-type assumptions. Since the protocol is non-interactive, the relaxation to SPS security is needed, as standard polynomial-time simulation is impossible; however, a slight variant of our main protocol yields a SNISC with polynomial-time simulation in the CRS model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2020
- Keywords
- secure computationtwo-party computationsuccinctnon-interactivequasi-polynomial simulation
- Contact author(s)
-
asmorgan @ cs cornell edu
rafael @ cs cornell edu
antigonipoly @ gmail com - History
- 2020-02-20: revised
- 2019-11-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1341
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1341,
author = {Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass and Antigoni Polychroniadou},
title = {Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1341},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1341}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1341}
}
