How to Construct Rational Protocols with Nash Equilibrium Consistency in the UC framework

Xiaoxia Jiang; Youliang Tian

Paper 2019/1398

How to Construct Rational Protocols with Nash Equilibrium Consistency in the UC framework

Xiaoxia Jiang and Youliang Tian

Abstract

The inconsistency of Nash equilibrium of rational delegated computation scheme in the UC framework will lead to the lack of strict security proof of the protocols fundamentally. The consistency proof of Nash equilibrium between the ideal world and the real world has always been a challenge in the research field. In this paper, we analyze the Nash equilibrium according to the game model of rational delegated computation, and the ideal functionality for rational delegation of computation based on incentive-driven adversary is proposed, then we construct a rational delegated computation protocol for UC-realizing the ideal functionality. In a word, the proposed rational delegated computing protocol based on incentive-driven adversary has been proven to be secure in the universally composable framework, furthermore, we effectively solve the inconsistency problem of Nash equilibrium between the real world and the ideal world.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Universally composable Nash equilibrium Rational delegation of computation
Contact author(s): 15650751086 @ 163 com
yltian @ gzu edu cn
History: 2019-12-04: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/1398
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1398,
      author = {Xiaoxia Jiang and Youliang Tian},
      title = {How to Construct Rational Protocols with Nash Equilibrium Consistency in the UC framework},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1398},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1398}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1398}
}