Paper 2019/293
Impossibility of Strong KDM Security with Auxiliary Input
Cody Freitag, Ilan Komargodski, and Rafael Pass
Abstract
In this note, we show that a strong notion of KDM security cannot be obtained by any encryption scheme in the auxiliary input setting, assuming Learning With Errors (LWE) and one-way permutations. The notion of security we deal with guarantees that for any (possibly inefficient) function $f$, it is computationally hard to distinguish between an encryption of 0s and an encryption of f(pk, z), where pk is the public key and z is the auxiliary input. Furthermore, we show that this holds even when restricted to bounded-length auxiliary input where z is much shorter than pk under the additional assumption that (non-leveled) fully homomorphic encryption exists.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- KDM SecurityImpossibility
- Contact author(s)
-
cfreitag @ cs cornell edu
komargodski @ cornell edu
rafael @ cs cornell edu - History
- 2019-03-20: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/293
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/293,
author = {Cody Freitag and Ilan Komargodski and Rafael Pass},
title = {Impossibility of Strong KDM Security with Auxiliary Input},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/293},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/293}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/293}
}
