Paper 2019/785

A publicly verifiable quantum blind signature scheme without entanglement based on asymmetric cryptography

Yalin Chen, Jue-Sam Chou, Liang-Chun Wang, and Yu-Yuan Chou

Abstract

In recent years, several cryptographic scholars have proposed quantum blind signature schemes. However, their methods require the signatories and the inspectors to share common keys in advance, which makes them not only complicated in concept, but also suffering deniable problem. Moreover, due to the fact that not everyone can verify the blind signature, it needs to have a designated verifier. In view of Laurent, et al.’s argument that other than the assumption of the pre-image being collision-free, the one-way hash function is an attractive cryptographic component in the post-quantum era when designing a cryptosystem. Inspired by this, we propose a publicly verifiable quantum blind signature scheme based on the hash function. After security analyses, we confirm that our quantum blind signature not only is secure, but also have the needed properties. It includes anonymity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, blindness, public verifiability, and traceability. Hence, we conclude that this approach is better than the state-of-the-art, and is therefore more suitable for applications in real life, such as, mobile payments, quantum voting, or quantum government.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Undeniable quantum signature schemeImpersonation attackQuantum asymmetric cryptographyTrapdoor one-way functionSingle-qubit rotations encryptionPublicly verifiable signature
Contact author(s)
jschou @ nhu edu tw
jschou @ mail nhu edu tw
History
2019-07-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/785
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/785,
      author = {Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou and Liang-Chun Wang and Yu-Yuan Chou},
      title = {A publicly verifiable quantum blind signature scheme without entanglement based on asymmetric cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/785},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/785}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/785}
}
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