Paper 2020/1198

Finding EM leakages at design stage: a simulation methodology

Davide Poggi, Philippe Maurine, Thomas Ordas, Alexandre Sarafianos, and Jérémy Raoult

Abstract

For many years EM Side-Channel Attacks, which exploit the statistical link between the magnetic field radiated by secure ICs and the data they process, are a critical threat. Indeed, attackers need to find only one hotspot (position of the EM probe over the IC surface) where there is an exploitable leakage to compromise the security. As a result, designing secure ICs robust against these attacks is incredibly difficult because designers must warrant there is no hotspot over the whole IC surface. This task is all the more difficult as there is no CAD tool to compute the magnetic field radiated by ICs and hence no methodology to detect hotspots at the design stages. Within this context, this paper introduces a flow allowing predicting the EM radiations of ICs and two related methodologies. The first one aims at identifying and quantifying the dangerousness of EM hotspots at the surface of ICs, i.e. positions where to place an EM probe to capture a leakage. The second aims at locating leakage hotspots in ICs, i.e. areas in circuits from where these leakages originate.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
davide poggi93 @ gmail com
History
2020-10-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1198
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1198,
      author = {Davide Poggi and Philippe Maurine and Thomas Ordas and Alexandre Sarafianos and Jérémy Raoult},
      title = {Finding EM leakages at design stage: a simulation methodology},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1198},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1198}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1198}
}
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