Paper 2020/883
On The Deployment of Tweak-in-Plaintext Protection Against Differential Fault Analysis
Jeroen Delvaux
Abstract
In an article from HOST 2018, which appears in extended form in the Cryptology ePrint Archive, Baksi, Bhasin, Breier, Khairallah, and Peyrin proposed the tweak-in-plaintext method to protect block ciphers against a differential fault analysis (DFA). We argue that this method lacks existential motivation as neither of its two envisioned use cases, i.e., the electronic codebook (ECB) and the cipher block chaining (CBC) modes of operation, is competitive. Furthermore, in a variant of the method where nonces are generated using a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), several security problems have not been anticipated for. Finally, we analyze the security level against a brute-force DFA more rigorously than in the original work.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- differential fault analysiscipher block chainingprovable security
- Contact author(s)
- jeroen delvaux @ osr-tech com
- History
- 2020-07-16: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/883
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/883,
author = {Jeroen Delvaux},
title = {On The Deployment of Tweak-in-Plaintext Protection Against Differential Fault Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/883},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/883}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/883}
}
