Paper 2021/465

Cryptanalysis of `MAKE'

Daniel Brown, Neal Koblitz, and Jason LeGrow

Abstract

In a recent eprint, Rahman and Shpilrain proposed a Diffie-Hellman style key exchange based on a semidirect product of $n × n$-matrices over a finite field. We show that, using public information, an adversary can recover the agreed upon secret key by solving a system of $n^2$ linear equations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
key exchangematrix-basedcryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
koblitz @ uw edu
History
2021-04-12: revised
2021-04-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/465
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/465,
      author = {Daniel Brown and Neal Koblitz and Jason LeGrow},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of `MAKE'},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/465},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/465}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/465}
}
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