Paper 2022/1223
Efficient Proofs of Software Exploitability for Real-world Processors
Abstract
We consider the problem of proving in zero-knowledge the existence of vulnerabilities in executables compiled to run on real-world processors. We demonstrate that it is practical to prove knowledge of real exploits for real-world processor architectures without the need for source code and without limiting our consideration to narrow vulnerability classes. To achieve this, we devise a novel circuit compiler and a toolchain that produces highly optimized, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for programs executed on the MSP430, an ISA commonly used in embedded hardware. Our toolchain employs a highly optimized circuit compiler and a number of novel optimizations to construct efficient proofs for program binaries. To demonstrate the capability of our system, we test our toolchain by constructing proofs for challenges in the Microcorruption capture the flag exercises.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PoPETs
- Keywords
- zero-knowledge proof NIZK Reverie exploits real-world processors MSP430 KKW
- Contact author(s)
-
mgreen @ cs jhu edu
mathias @ hall-andersen dk
eric hennenfent @ trailofbits com
kaptchuk @ bu edu
benperez1227 @ gmail com
gijs vanlaer @ jhu edu - History
- 2022-09-15: approved
- 2022-09-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1223
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1223,
author = {Matthew Green and Mathias Hall-Andersen and Eric Hennenfent and Gabriel Kaptchuk and Benjamin Perez and Gijs Van Laer},
title = {Efficient Proofs of Software Exploitability for Real-world Processors},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1223},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1223}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1223}
}
