Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers

Christian Janson; Patrick Struck

Paper 2022/139

Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers

Christian Janson, Technische Universität Darmstadt

Patrick Struck, Universität Regensburg

Abstract

In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT'19). We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. 13th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2022)
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12
Contact author(s): christian janson @ tu-darmstadt de
patrick struck @ ur de
History: 2022-09-28: revised; 2022-02-09: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/139
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/139,
      author = {Christian Janson and Patrick Struck},
      title = {Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/139},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139}
}