Paper 2022/1711

Nonce- and Redundancy-encrypting Modes with Farfalle

Seth Hoffert
Abstract

Nonces are a fact of life for achieving semantic security. Generating a uniformly random nonce can be costly and may not always be feasible. Using anything other than uniformly random bits can result in information leakage; e.g., a timestamp can deanonymize a communication and a counter can leak the quantity of transmitted messages. Ideally, we would like to be able to efficiently encrypt the nonce to 1) avoid needing uniformly random bits and 2) avoid information leakage. This paper presents new modes built on top of Farfalle that achieve nonce and redundancy encryption in the AEAD and onion AE settings.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
farfalledeck functionsauthenticated encryptionwide block ciphermodes of useencrypted nonceonion AE
Contact author(s)
seth hoffert @ gmail com
History
2023-01-16: last of 4 revisions
2022-12-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1711
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1711,
      author = {Seth Hoffert},
      title = {Nonce- and Redundancy-encrypting Modes with Farfalle},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1711},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1711}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1711}
}
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