Paper 2022/951
MixCT: Mixing Confidential Transactions from Homomorphic Commitment
Abstract
Mixing protocols serve as a promising solution to the unlinkability in blockchains. They work by hiding one transaction among a set of transactions and enjoy the advantage of high compatibility with the underlying system. However, due to the inherently public nature of the blockchains built on the account-based model, the unlinkability is highly restricted to non-confidential transactions. In the account-based model, blockchains supporting confidential payments need to trade their compatibility for unlinkability. In this paper, we propose MixCT, a generic protocol that provides the mixing service for confidential payment systems built from homomorphic commitment in the account-based model. We formally define the security goals including safety and availability, and prove that our generic construction satisfies them. Furthermore, we provide an efficient instantiation of MixCT by the Pedersen commitment and the one-out-of-many proof. The evaluation results show that MixCT introduces a small cost for its users while being highly compatible with the underlying confidential blockchain.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- blockchainconfidential transactionmixing service
- Contact author(s)
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cqdujiajun @ sjtu edu cn
zhonghui ge @ sjtu edu cn
longyu @ sjtu edu cn
liuzhen @ sjtu edu cn
shifeng sun @ sjtu edu cn
xuxian @ ecust edu cn
dwgu @ sjtu edu cn - History
- 2022-07-23: approved
- 2022-07-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/951
- License
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CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/951,
author = {Jiajun Du and Zhonghui Ge and Yu Long and Zhen Liu and Shifeng Sun and Xian Xu and Dawu Gu},
title = {MixCT: Mixing Confidential Transactions from Homomorphic Commitment},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/951},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/951}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/951}
}
