Paper 2023/376

Efficient computation of $(3^n,3^n)$-isogenies

Thomas Decru, imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Sabrina Kunzweiler, Univ. Bordeaux, CNRS, Bordeaux INP, Inria, France
Abstract

The parametrization of $(3,3)$-isogenies by Bruin, Flynn and Testa requires over 37.500 multiplications if one wants to evaluate a single isogeny in a point. We simplify their formulae and reduce the amount of required multiplications by 94%. Further we deduce explicit formulae for evaluating $(3,3)$-splitting and gluing maps in the framework of the parametrization by Bröker, Howe, Lauter and Stevenhagen. We provide implementations to compute $(3^n,3^n)$-isogenies between principally polarized abelian surfaces with a focus on cryptographic application. Our implementation can retrieve Alice's secret isogeny in 11 seconds for the SIKEp751 parameters, which were aimed at NIST level 5 security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. AfricaCrypt 2023
Keywords
isogeniesabelian surfacespost-quantum cryptographySIDH attack
Contact author(s)
thomas decru @ kuleuven be
sabrina kunzweiler @ math u-bordeaux fr
History
2023-05-12: revised
2023-03-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/376
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/376,
      author = {Thomas Decru and Sabrina Kunzweiler},
      title = {Efficient computation of $(3^n,3^n)$-isogenies},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/376},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/376}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/376}
}
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