Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek; Dakshita Khurana; Giulio Malavolta; Alexander Poremba; Michael Walter

Paper 2023/559

Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek, University of California, Berkeley

Dakshita Khurana, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Giulio Malavolta, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy

Alexander Poremba, California Institute of Technology

Michael Walter, Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Abstract

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on the use of indistinguishability obfuscation (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265) or almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, arXiv:2303.08676).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2023
Keywords: quantum cryptography public-key encryption certified deletion public verification
Contact author(s): bartusek james @ gmail com
dakshita @ illinois edu
giulio malavolta @ hotmail it
aporemba @ caltech edu
michael walter @ rub de
History: 2023-10-16: revised; 2023-04-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/559
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/559,
      author = {James Bartusek and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta and Alexander Poremba and Michael Walter},
      title = {Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/559},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/559}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/559}
}