Paper 2003/008
DFA on AES
Christophe Giraud
Abstract
In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The first one uses a fault model that induces a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result, hence allowing us to obtain the key by using 50 faulty ciphertexts for an AES-128. The second attack uses a more realistic fault model: we assume that we may induce a fault on a whole byte. For an AES-128, this second attack provides the key by using less than 250 faulty ciphertexts. Moreover, this attack has been successfully put into practice on a smart card.
Note: The first version of this paper was submitted in April 2002 to CHES'02.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The first version of this paper was submitted in April 2002 to CHES'02.
- Keywords
- AESDFAside-channel attackssmartcards.
- Contact author(s)
- c giraud @ oberthurcs com
- History
- 2003-05-14: last of 3 revisions
- 2003-01-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/008
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/008,
author = {Christophe Giraud},
title = {DFA on AES},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/008},
year = {2003},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/008}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/008}
}
