Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design: The Case of Online Auctions

Edith Elkind; Helger Lipmaa

Paper 2003/021

Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design: The Case of Online Auctions

Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa

Abstract

We propose a new cryptographically protected multi-round auction mechanism for online auctions. This auction mechanism is designed to provide (in this order) security, cognitive convenience, and round-effectiveness. One can vary internal parameters of the mechanism to trade off bid privacy and cognitive costs, or cognitive costs and the number of rounds. We are aware of no previous work that interleaves cryptography explicitly with the mechanism design.

Note: Corresponds to the preproceedings version.

Metadata

Available format(s): PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Accepted to Financial Cryptography 2004
Keywords: auctions cognitive costs cryptography mechanism design privacy
Contact author(s): helger @ tcs hut fi
History: 2003-12-30: last of 4 revisions; 2003-02-03: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/021
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/021,
      author = {Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa},
      title = {Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design: The Case of Online Auctions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/021},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/021}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/021}
}