In distributed networks, a target party could be a person never meet with a source party , therefore
may not hold any prior evaluation of trustworthiness of . To get permit to access , should be somewhat
trusted by . Consequently, we should study the approach to evaluate trustworthiness of . To attack the
problem, we view individual participant in distributed networks as a node of a delegation graph and map a
delegation path from target party to source party in networks into an edge in the correspondent transitive
closure of graph . Based on the transitive closure property of the graph , we decompose the problem to three
related questions below:
-how to evaluate trustworthiness of participants in an edge?
-how to compute trustworthiness of participants in a path?
-how to evaluate the trustworthiness of a target participant in a transitive closure graph?
We attack the above three questions by first computing trustworthiness of participants in distributed and
authenticated channel. Then we present a practical approach to evaluate trustworthiness by removing the assumption
of the authenticated channel in distributed networks.
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/056,
author = {Huafei Zhu and Bao Feng and Robert H. Deng},
title = {Computing of Trust in Distributed Networks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/056},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/056}
}
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