Paper 2003/205
Improved Cryptanalysis of SecurID
Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin
Abstract
SecurID is a widely used hardware token for strengthening
authentication in a corporate environment. Recently,
Biryukov, Lano, and Preneel presented an attack on the alleged
SecurID hash function~\cite{BLP}. They showed
that {\it vanishing differentials} -- collisions
of the hash function -- occur quite frequently, and that
such differentials allow an attacker to recover the secret key in the
token much faster than exhaustive search. Based on
simulation results, they estimated that given a single 2-bit vanishing
differential, the running time of their attack would be about
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- SecurIDcryptanalysishash functioncollisionvanishing differential
- Contact author(s)
- scontini @ ics mq edu au
- History
- 2003-10-21: revised
- 2003-09-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/205
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/205, author = {Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin}, title = {Improved Cryptanalysis of {SecurID}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/205}, year = {2003}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/205} }