Paper 2007/021
Two Trivial Attacks on Trivium
Alexander Maximov and Alex Biryukov
Abstract
Trivium is a stream cipher designed in 2005 by C. De Cannière and B. Preneel for the European project eSTREAM. It has successfully passed the first phase of the project and has been selected for a special focus in the second phase for the hardware portfolio of the project. Trivium has an internal state of size 288 bits and the key of length 80 bits. Although the design has a simple and elegant structure, no attack on it has been found yet.
In this paper we study a class of Trivium-like designs. We propose a set of techniques that one can apply in cryptanalysis of such constructions. The first group of methods is for recovering the internal state and the secret key of the cipher, given a piece of a known keystream. Our attack is more than
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Triviumstream ciphers
- Contact author(s)
- movax @ it lth se
- History
- 2007-01-26: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/021
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/021, author = {Alexander Maximov and Alex Biryukov}, title = {Two Trivial Attacks on Trivium}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/021}, year = {2007}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/021} }