Paper 2008/288

How to Launch A Birthday Attack Against DES

Zhengjun Cao

Abstract

We present a birthday attack against DES. It is entirely based on the relationship $L_{i+1}=R_{i}$ and the simple key schedule in DES. It requires about $2^{16}$ ciphertexts of the same $R_{16}$, encrypted by the same key $K$. We conjecture it has a computational complexity of $2^{48}$. Since the requirement for the birthday attack is more accessible than that for Differential cryptanalysis, Linear cryptanalysis or Davies' attack, it is of more practical significance.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
caoamss @ gmail com
History
2008-07-18: revised
2008-07-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/288
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/288,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao},
      title = {How to Launch A Birthday Attack Against DES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/288},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/288}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/288}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.