Paper 2009/005
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES
Wei Wang, Xiaoyun Wang, and Guangwu Xu
Abstract
In this paper, the impossible differential cryptanalysis is extended to MAC algorithms \textsc{Pelican}, MT-MAC and PC-MAC based on AES and 4-round AES. First, we collect message pairs that produce the inner near-collision with some specific differences by the birthday attack. Then the impossible differential attack on 4-round AES is implemented using a 3-round impossible differential property. For \textsc{Pelican}, our attack can recover the internal state, which is an equivalent subkey. For MT-MAC-AES, the attack turns out to be a subkey recovery attack directly. The data complexity of the two attacks is $2^{85.5}$ chosen messages, and the time complexity is about $2^{85.5}$ queries. For PC-MAC-AES, we can recover the 256-bit key with $2^{85.5}$ chosen messages and $2^{128}$ queries.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- MACCryptanalysisImpossible differentialAES
- Contact author(s)
- xiaoyunwang @ mail tsinghua edu cn
- History
- 2009-01-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/005
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/005,
author = {Wei Wang and Xiaoyun Wang and Guangwu Xu},
title = {Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/005},
year = {2009},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/005}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/005}
}
