Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB

Dmitry Frumkin; Adi Shamir

Paper 2009/044

Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB

Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir

Abstract

With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: RFID LPN HB+Trusted-HB
Contact author(s): dmitry frumkin @ gmail com
History: 2009-01-29: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/044
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/044,
      author = {Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir},
      title = {Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/044},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/044}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/044}
}