Paper 2009/500

Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

Nils Reimers

Abstract

This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it's possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity. This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptanalysiskey recoverystream cipher
Contact author(s)
Rnils @ web de
History
2009-10-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/500
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/500,
      author = {Nils Reimers},
      title = {Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/500},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/500}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/500}
}
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