Paper 2010/408

Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded AES Implementations

Jean-François Gallais, Ilya Kizhvatov, and Michael Tunstall

Abstract

In this paper we present two attacks that exploit cache events, which are visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an implementation of AES. The first is an improvement of an adaptive chosen plaintext attack presented at ACISP 2006. The second is a new known plaintext attack that can recover a 128-bit key with approximately 30 measurements to reduce the number of key hypotheses to 2^30. This is comparable to classical Dierential Power Analysis; however, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking techniques. We also show how to deal with unreliable cache event detection in the real-life measurement scenario and present practical explorations on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. An extended abstract of this paper will appear at WISA 2010. This is the full version.
Keywords
Side channel attackspower analysiscache attacksAES
Contact author(s)
jean-francois gallais @ uni lu
History
2010-09-23: last of 2 revisions
2010-07-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/408
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/408,
      author = {Jean-François Gallais and Ilya Kizhvatov and Michael Tunstall},
      title = {Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded AES Implementations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/408},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/408}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/408}
}
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