ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL

Konstantinos Chalkias; Foteini Baldimtsi; Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis; Spyros T.  Halkidis; George Stephanides

Paper 2010/500

ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL

Konstantinos Chalkias, Foteini Baldimtsi, Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis, Spyros T. Halkidis, and George Stephanides

Abstract

We discuss a recently proposed one-pass authenticated key agreement protocol, by Mohammad, Chen, Hsu and Lo, which was “derived” from their correponding two-pass version and claimed to be secure. We show that this is not the case by demonstrating a number of vulnerabilities.

Metadata

Available format(s): PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: impersonation attacks key agreement loss of information key compromise denial of service.
Contact author(s): chalkias @ java uom gr
History: 2012-08-02: last of 2 revisions; 2010-09-30: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/500
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/500,
      author = {Konstantinos Chalkias and Foteini Baldimtsi and Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis and Spyros T.  Halkidis and George Stephanides},
      title = {ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/500},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/500}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/500}
}