Paper 2010/636

Differential Fault Analysis of AES using a Single Multiple-Byte Fault

Subidh Ali, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Michael Tunstall

Abstract

In this paper we present an improved fault attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This paper presents an improvement on a recently published differential fault analysis of AES that requires one fault to recover the secret key being used. This attack requires that one byte entering into the eighth round is corrupted. We show that the attack is possible where more than one byte has been affected. Experimental results are described where a fault is injected using a glitch in the clock, demonstrating that this attack is practical.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
debdeep mukhopadhyay @ gmail com
History
2010-12-15: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/636
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/636,
      author = {Subidh Ali and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay and Michael Tunstall},
      title = {Differential Fault Analysis of AES using a Single Multiple-Byte Fault},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/636},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/636}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/636}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.