Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering

Mihir Bellare; David Cash; Rachel Miller

Paper 2011/252

Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering

Mihir Bellare, David Cash, and Rachel Miller

Abstract

We show how to leverage the RKA (Related-Key Attack) security of blockciphers to provide RKA security for a suite of high-level primitives. This motivates a more general theoretical question, namely, when is it possible to transfer RKA security from a primitive P1 to a primitive P2? We provide both positive and negative answers. What emerges is a broad and high level picture of the way achievability of RKA security varies across primitives, showing, in particular, that some primitives resist ``more'' RKAs than others. A technical challenge was to achieve RKA security even for the practical classes of related-key deriving (RKD) functions underlying fault injection attacks that fail to satisfy the ``claw-freeness'' assumption made in previous works. We surmount this barrier for the first time based on the construction of PRGs that are not only RKA secure but satisfy a new notion of identity-collision-resistance.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Preliminary version in Asiacrypt 2011. This is the full version.
Keywords: Related-key attack tamper-resistance pseudorandom functions signatures identity-based encryption
Contact author(s): mihir @ eng ucsd edu
History: 2011-09-06: last of 2 revisions; 2011-05-23: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/252
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/252,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and David Cash and Rachel Miller},
      title = {Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/252},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/252}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/252}
}