Strongly Secure One Round Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Security

Hai Huang

Paper 2011/346

Strongly Secure One Round Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Security

Hai Huang

Abstract

This paper investigates the two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) with perfect forward security. Currently, there exist no authenticated key exchange protocols which are provably secure in eCK model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. We propose a new two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol which enjoys following desirable properties. \textbf{First}, our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Moreover, our protocol does not use the NAXOS transformation, the drawback of which will be discussed in the introduction. \textbf{Second}, under the same assumption, we prove that our protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is first two-pass (one round) AKE protocol provably secure in the eCK model and achieving perfect forward security against active adversary.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. To some conference, submmision date: May 15, 2011
Contact author(s): haihuang1005 @ gmail com
History: 2011-06-27: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/346
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/346,
      author = {Hai Huang},
      title = {Strongly Secure One Round Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/346},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/346}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/346}
}