Paper 2011/683

Timing Attacks against the Syndrome Inversion in Code-based Cryptosystems

Falko Strenzke

Abstract

In this work we present the first practical key-aimed timing attack against code-based cryptosystems. It arises from vulnerabilities that are present in the inversion of the error syndrome through the Extended Euclidean Algorithm that is part of the decryption operation of these schemes. Three types of timing vulnerabilities are combined to a successful attack. Each is used to gain information about the secret support, which is part of code-based decryption keys: The first allows recovery of the zero-element, the second is a refinement of a previously described vulnerability yielding linear equations, and the third enables to retrieve cubic equations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
ide channel attacktiming attackpost quantum crypto-graphycode-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
fstrenzke @ crypto-source de
fstrenzke @ gmx de
History
2012-08-07: revised
2011-12-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/683
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/683,
      author = {Falko Strenzke},
      title = {Timing Attacks against the Syndrome Inversion in Code-based Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/683},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/683}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/683}
}
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