Paper 2012/681

Resilience to Distinguishing Attacks on WG-7 Cipher and Their Generalizations

Guang Gong, Mark Aagaard, and Xinxin Fan

Abstract

The stream cipher WG-7 is a lightweight variant of the well-known Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family, targeting for resource-constrained devices like RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes. Recently, a distinguishing attack was discovered against the stream cipher WG-7 by Orumiehchiha, Pieprzyk and Steinfeld. In this paper, we extend their work to a general distinguishing attack and suggest criteria to protect the WG stream cipher family from this attack. Our analysis shows that by properly choosing the minimal polynomial of the linear feedback shift register for a WG stream cipher, the general distinguishing attack can be easily thwarted.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Stream CipherWG-7Distinguishing Attack
Contact author(s)
x5fan @ uwaterloo ca
History
2012-12-10: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/681
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/681,
      author = {Guang Gong and Mark Aagaard and Xinxin Fan},
      title = {Resilience to Distinguishing Attacks on WG-7 Cipher and Their Generalizations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/681},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/681}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/681}
}
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