Paper 2013/125
Deterministic Public-Key Encryption for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions
Ananth Raghunathan, Gil Segev, and Salil Vadhan
Abstract
Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill (CRYPTO '07) initiated the study of
deterministic public-key encryption as an alternative in scenarios where randomized encryption has inherent drawbacks. The resulting line of research has so far guaranteed security only for
adversarially-chosen plaintext distributions that are independent of the public key used by the scheme. In most scenarios, however, it is typically not realistic to assume that adversaries do not take the public key into account when attacking a scheme.
We show that it is possible to guarantee meaningful security even for plaintext distributions that depend on the public key. We extend the previously proposed notions of security, allowing adversaries to adaptively choose plaintext distributions {\em after} seeing the public key, in an interactive manner. The only restrictions we make are that: (1) plaintext distributions are unpredictable (as is essential in deterministic public-key encryption), and (2) the number of plaintext distributions from which each adversary is allowed to adaptively choose is
upper bounded by
Note: This is the full version.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2013
- Keywords
- Public-key encryptiondeterministic encryptionrandomness extraction.
- Contact author(s)
- segev @ cs huji ac il
- History
- 2018-03-11: last of 10 revisions
- 2013-03-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/125
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/125, author = {Ananth Raghunathan and Gil Segev and Salil Vadhan}, title = {Deterministic Public-Key Encryption for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/125}, year = {2013}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/125} }