Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System

Filip Zagorski; Richard T.  Carback; David Chaum; Jeremy Clark; Aleksander Essex; Poorvi L.  Vora

Paper 2013/214

Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System

Filip Zagorski, Richard T. Carback, David Chaum, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, and Poorvi L. Vora

Abstract

We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software or a corrupt election authority—two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.

Note: This paper extends the version appearing at ACNS 2013 with an appendix.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Published elsewhere. The 11th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2013)
Keywords: election schemes
Contact author(s): clark @ scs carleton ca
History: 2013-04-15: revised; 2013-04-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/214
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/214,
      author = {Filip Zagorski and Richard T.  Carback and David Chaum and Jeremy Clark and Aleksander Essex and Poorvi L.  Vora},
      title = {Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/214},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/214}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/214}
}