Paper 2013/649
Security Analysis of Password-Authenticated Key Retrieval
SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara
Abstract
A PAKR (Password-Authenticated Key Retrieval) protocol and its multi-server system allow one party (say, client), who has a rememberable password, to retrieve a long-term static key in an exchange of messages with at least one other party (say, server) that has a private key associated with the password. In this paper, we analyze the only one PAKR (named as PKRS-1) standardized in IEEE 1363.2 [9] and its multi-server system (also, [11]) by showing that any passive/active attacker can find out the client's password and the static key with off-line dictionary attacks. This result is contrary to the security statement of PKRS-1 (see Chapter 10.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9]).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Password authenticationkey retrievalon-lineoff-line dictionary attacksIEEE 1363.2
- Contact author(s)
- seonghan shin @ aist go jp
- History
- 2013-10-15: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/649
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/649,
author = {SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara},
title = {Security Analysis of Password-Authenticated Key Retrieval},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/649},
year = {2013},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/649}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/649}
}
