Some security bounds for the DGHV scheme

Franca Marinelli; Riccardo Aragona; Chiara Marcolla; Massimiliano Sala

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Paper 2014/068

Some security bounds for the DGHV scheme

Franca Marinelli, Riccardo Aragona, Chiara Marcolla, and Massimiliano Sala

Abstract

The correctness in decrypting a ciphertext after some operations in the DGVH scheme depends heavily on the dimension of the secret key. In this paper we compute two bounds on the size of the secret key for the DGHV scheme to decrypt correctly a ciphertext after a fixed number of additions and a fixed number of multiplication. Moreover we improve the original bound on the dimension of the secret key for a general circuit.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Public-key cryptography Fully Homomorphic Encryption Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption DGVH scheme.
Contact author(s): chiara marcolla @ gmail com
History: 2014-01-31: revised; 2014-01-31: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/068
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/068,
      author = {Franca Marinelli and Riccardo Aragona and Chiara Marcolla and Massimiliano Sala},
      title = {Some security bounds for the DGHV scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/068},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/068}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/068}
}