Time-lock puzzles, introduced by May, Rivest, Shamir and Wagner, is a mechanism for sending messages ``to the future''. A sender
can quickly generate a puzzle with a solution that remains hidden until a moderately large amount of time has elapsed. The solution should be hidden from any adversary that runs in time significantly less than , including resourceful parallel adversaries with polynomially many processors.
While the notion of time-lock puzzles has been around for 22 years, there has only been a *single* candidate proposed. Fifteen years ago, Rivest, Shamir and Wagner suggested a beautiful candidate time-lock puzzle based on the assumption that exponentiation modulo an RSA integer is an ``inherently sequential'' computation.
We show that various flavors of {\em randomized encodings} give rise to time-lock puzzles of varying strengths, whose security can be shown assuming *the existence* of non-parallelizing languages, which are languages that require circuits of depth at least to decide, in the worst-case. The existence of such languages is necessary for the existence of time-lock puzzles.
We instantiate the construction with different randomized
encodings from the literature, where increasingly better efficiency is obtained based on increasingly stronger cryptographic assumptions, ranging from one-way functions to indistinguishability obfuscation. We also observe that time-lock puzzles imply one-way functions, and thus the reliance on some cryptographic assumption is necessary.
Finally, generalizing the above, we construct other types of puzzles such as *proofs of work* from randomized encodings and a
suitable worst-case hardness assumption (that is necessary for such puzzles to exist).
Note: Added a comment about preprocessing TLPs and their construction from weak TLPs. Revised a statement and proof in appendix B.
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/514,
author = {Nir Bitansky and Shafi Goldwasser and Abhishek Jain and Omer Paneth and Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Brent Waters},
title = {Time-Lock Puzzles from Randomized Encodings},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/514},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/514}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org
does not use cookies or embedded third party content.