eprint.iacr.org will be offline for approximately an hour for routine maintenance at 11pm UTC on Tuesday, April 16. We lost some data between April 12 and April 14, and some authors have been notified that they need to resubmit their papers.

Paper 2015/746

A 2^{70} Attack on the Full MISTY1

Achiya Bar-On

Abstract

MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It is widely deployed in Japan, and is recognized internationally as a European NESSIE-recommended cipher and an ISO standard. After almost 20 years of unsuccessful cryptanalytic attempts, a first attack on the full MISTY1 was presented at CRYPTO 2015 by Todo. The attack, using a new technique called {\it division property}, requires almost the full codebook and has time complexity of 2^{107.3} encryptions. In this paper we present a new attack on the full MISTY1. It is based on a modified variant of Todo's division property, along with a variety of refined key-recovery techniques. Our attack requires the full codebook, but allows to retrieve 49 bits of the secret key in time complexity of only 2^{64} encryptions, and the full key in time complexity of 2^{69.5} encryptions. While our attack is clearly impractical due to its large data complexity, it shows that MISTY1 provides security of only 2^{70} --- significantly less than what was considered before.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
MISTY1block cipherdivision propertyintegral cryptanalysispartial sumsintegral attack2D meet-in-the-middle
Contact author(s)
abo1000 @ gmail com
nathan keller27 @ gmail com
History
2015-07-30: revised
2015-07-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/746
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/746,
      author = {Achiya Bar-On},
      title = {A 2^{70} Attack on the Full MISTY1},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/746},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/746}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/746}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.