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Paper 2016/958
SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets
Michał Zieliński
Abstract
CRIME and BREACH attacks on TLS/SSL leverage the fact that compression ratio is not hidden by encryption to recover content of secrets. We introduce SafeDeflate---a modification of a standard Deflate algorithm which compression ratio does not leak information about secret tokens. The modification is compatible with existing Deflate and gzip decompressors. We introduce a model in which attacker can obtain ciphertexts of arbitrary compressed plaintext containing secret values. Then we prove that SafeDeflate is secure in this model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- compressioninformation leakCRIME
- Contact author(s)
- michal @ zielinscy org pl
- History
- 2016-10-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/958
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/958,
author = {Michał Zieliński},
title = {SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/958},
year = {2016},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/958}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/958}
}
