Paper 2017/069

The Exact Security of PMAC

Peter Gaži, Krzysztof Pietrzak, and Michal Rybár

Abstract

PMAC is a simple and parallel block-cipher mode of operation, which was introduced by Black and Rogaway at Eurocrypt 2002. If instantiated with a (pseudo)random permutation over n-bit strings, PMAC constitutes a provably secure variable input-length (pseudo)random function. For adversaries making q queries, each of length at most $\ell$ (in n-bit blocks), and of total length $\sigma \le q\ell$, the original paper proves an upper bound on the distinguishing advantage of $O({\sigma }^2/2^n)$, while the currently best bound is $O(q\sigma /2^n)$. In this work we show that this bound is tight by giving an attack with advantage $\mathrm{\Omega }(q^2\ell /2^n)$. In the PMAC construction one initially XORs a mask to every message block, where the mask for the i-th block is computed as ${\tau }_i:={\gamma }_i\cdot L$, where $L$ is a (secret) random value, and $$ is the i-th codeword of the Gray code. Our attack applies more generally to any sequence of $$’s which contains a large coset of a subgroup of $$. We then investigate, if the security of PMAC can be further improved by using $$’s that are $$-wise independent, for $$ (the original distribution is only 1-wise independent). We observe that the security of PMAC will not increase in general, even if the masks are chosen from a 2-wise independent distribution, and then prove that the security increases to $$, if the $$'s are 4-wise independent. Due to simple extension attacks, this is the best bound one can hope for, using any distribution on the masks. Whether 3-wise independence is already sufficient to get this level of security is left as an open problem.