Cryptanalysis of HK17

Haoyu Li; Renzhang Liu; Yanbin Pan; Tianyuan Xie

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Paper 2017/1259

Cryptanalysis of HK17

Haoyu Li, Renzhang Liu, Yanbin Pan, and Tianyuan Xie

Abstract

Very recently, a key exchange scheme called HK17 was submitted to NIST as a candidate of the standard of post-quantum cryptography. The HK17 scheme employs some hypercomplex numbers as the basic objects, such as quaternions and octonions. In this paper, we show that HK17 is insecure since a passive adversary can recover the shared key in polynomial time.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Key exchange
Contact author(s): panyanbin @ amss ac cn
History: 2017-12-31: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/1259
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1259,
      author = {Haoyu Li and Renzhang Liu and Yanbin Pan and Tianyuan Xie},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of HK17},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/1259},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1259}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1259}
}