Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack

Bo-Yeon Sim; Dong-Guk Han

Paper 2019/1236

Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack

Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han

Abstract

In this paper, we propose that countermeasures against instruction-related timing attack would be vulnerable to single-trace attacks, which are presented at ISPEC 2017 and CHES 2019. The countermeasures use determiner to make operations, which leak timing side-channel information, perform in a constant-time. Since determiner is divided into two groups according to secret credentials, it is possible to recover secret credentials by clustering determiner into two groups.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Side-Channe Attacks Timing Attack Countermeasures Single-Trace Attack Clustering
Contact author(s): qjdusls @ kookmin ac kr
christa @ kookmin ac kr
History: 2019-10-23: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/1236
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1236,
      author = {Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han},
      title = {Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1236},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1236}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1236}
}