Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited

Shohei Egashira; Yuyu Wang; Keisuke Tanaka

Paper 2019/1488

Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited

Shohei Egashira, Yuyu Wang, and Keisuke Tanaka

Abstract

Fine-grained cryptographic primitives are secure against adversaries with bounded resources and can be computed by honest users with less resources than the adversaries. In this paper, we revisit the results by Degwekar, Vaikuntanathan, and Vasudevan in Crypto 2016 on fine-grained cryptography and show constructions of three key fundamental fine-grained cryptographic primitives: one-way permutations, hash proof systems (which in turn implies a public-key encryption scheme against chosen chiphertext attacks), and trapdoor one-way functions. All of our constructions are computable in $\mathsf{NC}^1$ and secure against (non-uniform) $\mathsf{NC}^1$ circuits under the widely believed worst-case assumption $\mathsf{NC}^1 \subsetneq \oplus \mathsf{L/poly}$.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_22
Keywords: Fine-grained cryptography NC1 circuit One-way permutation Hash proof system Trapdoor one-way function
Contact author(s): egashira s aa @ m titech ac jp
wangyuyu @ uestc edu cn
keisuke @ is titech ac jp
History: 2019-12-30: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/1488
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1488,
      author = {Shohei Egashira and Yuyu Wang and Keisuke Tanaka},
      title = {Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1488},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_22},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1488}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1488}
}