Paper 2019/467
Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)
Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert
Abstract
Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important -- yet less discussed -- dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Proceedings of Africacrypt 2019
- Keywords
- side-channel analysislocation privacy
- Contact author(s)
- clement massart @ uclouvain be
- History
- 2019-05-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/467
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/467,
author = {Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert},
title = {Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/467},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/467}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/467}
}
