Paper 2019/540
A chosen key attack against the secret S-boxes of GOST
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
Abstract
I am making this work from August 1998 available for historical reasons. It has been cited as an ``unpublished manuscript'' more than two dozen times over the years -- even though it has not been publicly available anywhere for almost 20 years. The short memo describes a simple non-intrusive reverse engineering technique against Russian GOST chips. The technique is based on a slide attack. This may be historically interesting since slide attacks had not been ``invented yet'', at least in formal sense. The brief original abstract: We show that a simple ``black box'' chosen-key attack against GOST can recover secret S-boxes with approximately $2^{32}$ encryptions.
Note: The August 1998 memo is included in its original form, prefaced by some historical notes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- GOSTMagmaSlide Attack
- Contact author(s)
- mjos @ iki fi
- History
- 2019-05-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/540
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/540,
author = {Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen},
title = {A chosen key attack against the secret S-boxes of GOST},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/540},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/540}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/540}
}
